Publications of Robinson, H.
"Reductionism and Emergence". In: Le Poidevin R, editor. The Routledge companion to metaphysics. London: Routledge; 2008. (Routledge philosophy companions).
Why Frank should not have jilted Mary. In: Wright EL, editor. The case for qualia. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press; 2008. p. 223-47.
Book Review: A. D. Smith: The Problem of Perception
The article reviews the book " The Problem of Perception," by A. D. Smith.
Personal identity, the self, and time. In: Batthyany A, Elitzur AC, editors. Mind and its place in the world : non-reductionist approaches to the ontology of consciousness. Frankfurt: Ontos; 2006. (Phenomenology & mind, Bd. 7).
"Substance". In: E. Z, editor. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.; 2005.
Sense-data, intentionality and common-sense. In: Forrai G, Kampis G, editors. Intentionality: past and future. Amsterdam: Rodopi; 2005. p. 79-89.
Reply to Nathan: How to reconstruct the causal argument. Acta Analytica. 2005;20(3):7-10.
Tyler Burge és a szociális externalizmus. Magyar Filozófiai Szemle. 2005;(3):411-37.
Dennett and the knowledge argument. In: Ludlow P, Nagasawa Y, Stoljar D, editors. There's something about Mary : essays on phenomenal consciousness and Frank Jackson's knowledge argument. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press; 2004. p. 69-73.
Selection from Matter and Sense. In: Crane T, Farkas K, editors. Metaphysics : a guide and anthology. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press; 2004. p. 107-19.
Thought experiments, ontology, and concept-dependent truthmakers. The Monist. 2004;(October):537-53.
"Dualism". In: Stich SP, Warfield TA, editors. The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. Malden, MA: Blackwell; 2003. p. 85-101. (Blackwell philosophy guides, 10).
"The ontology of the mental". In: Loux MJ, Zimmerman DW, editors. The Oxford handbook of metaphysics. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press; 2003. p. 527-55.
Some externalist strategies and their problems. Croatian journal of philosophy. 2003;3(7):21-34. Abstract
Some externalist strategies and their problems
I claim that there are four major strands of argument for externalism and set out to discuss three of them. The four are: (A) That referential thoughts are object-dependent. This I do not discuss. (B) That the semantics of natural kind terms is externalist. (C) That all semantic content, even of descriptive terms, stems from the causal relations of representations to the things or properties they designate in the external world. (D) That, because meaning is a social product and no individual can capture the whole social practice that defines a concept, what the speaker means always outruns what he can know. I briefly discuss (C) and (D) and conclude that they cannot be correct, because, if they were, the content of every thought would permanently transcend the reflective grasp of all thinkers. Then I discuss (B) and conclude that, though Putnam shows something interesting about natural kind terms-namely that a real verbal definition requires science-this has none of the consequences for philosophy of mind that it is normally supposed to have.
Két berkeleyánus érv a tér természetéről. In: Boros G, editor. Ész és szenvedély : filozófiai tanulmányok a XVII-XVIII. szazadról. Budapest: Áron Kiadó; 2002. p. 399-412.
Davidson and non-reductive physicalism: a tale of two cultures. In: Gillett C, Loewer B, editors. Physicalism and its discontents. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press; 2001. p. 129-51.
"Berkeley". In: Bunnin N, Tsui-James EP, editors. The Blackwell companion to philosophy. Oxford; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers; 1999.
Materialism in the philosophy of mind. In: Magee B, Craig E, editors. The Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.; 1998. p. 173-8.
Problems with the combinatorial theory of possibility. Acta Analytica. 1998;21:147-61. Abstract
Problems with the combinatorial theory of possibility
Armstrong's combinatorial theory of possibility faces a number of insuperable objections. In order to construct non-actual possible worlds from actual elements they must be fictionally recombined. I make three criticisms of Armstrong's reliance on fiction. First, fiction makes combinatorialism redundant. Second, fictionalism makes possibility insufficiently real. Third, Armstrong cannot provide an account of fiction within his own system that does not rely on possibility, mainly because of the essential role of dispositions in his theory of mind and, therefore, his theory of meaning. I continue by showing why possibilities cannot be confined to recombinations of actual elements, and suggest a somewhat neo-platonic theory of possibility that overcomes these problems.
Representing one world: the unity of science and realism in the special sciences. In: Forrai G, editor. Images and reality : proceedings of the 1996 Miskolc Conference. Miskolc: [s.n.]; 1997. p. 117-25.
Principles of human knowledge and Three dialogues. Robinson H, editor. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press; 1996.
Book Review: R. Schwarz: Vision.; 1996.
Perception. London ; New York: Routledge; 1994.
Objections to physicalism. Robinson H, editor. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press; 1993.
Introduction. In: Objections to Physicalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1993. p. 1-25.
Physicalism, Externalism and Perceptual Representation. In: Wright E, editor. New representationalisms : essays in the philosophy of perception. Aldershot u.a: Avebury; 1993. p. 103-14.
The Anti‑Materialist Strategy and the "Knowledge Argument. In: Objections to Physicalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1993. p. 159-83.
Dennett on the Knowledge Argument. Analysis. 1993;53(3):174-7.
Experience and Externalism: A Reply to Peter Smith. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 1992;92:221-3.
Varieties of Ontological Argument and the relevance of Kant's objections'. Annales. 1992:57-76.
Oxford studies in ancient philosophy, 1991:suppl.. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1991.
The Pursuit of mind. Manchester: Carcanet; 1991.
Form and the Immateriality of the Intellect from Aristotle to Aquinas'. In: Aristotle and the Later Tradition: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1991. p. 207-26.
The Flight from Mind. In: Tallis R, editor. The Pursuit of Mind. Manchester: Carcanet Press; 1991. p. 9-25.
The Development of Aristotle's Metaphysics: a review discussion of T.H. Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles, and D. W. Graham, Aristotle's Two Systems. Liverpool Classical Monthly,. 1991;16.
A Dualist Account of Embodiment. In: Smythies JR, Beloff J, editors. The Case for dualism. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia; 1989. p. 43-57.
A Dilemma for Physicalism (Structural and Functional Criteria for the Identity of Mental States). Hermes. 1989;(3):128-42. Abstract
A Dilemma for Physicalism (Structural and Functional Criteria for the Identity of Mental States)
The author shows, through various thought experiments, that the functionalist theory of the (according to which mental states are classed according to their structural or functional roles) as well as any form of materialism, are unable to account for sensations and for subjective and phenomenal qualities of mental experience.
Nietzsche, Lawrence and the somatic conception of the good life. New Comparison. 1988:40-56.
A Dualist Perspective on Psychological Development. In: Russell JA, editor. Philosophical perspectives on developmental psychology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; 1987. p. 119-39.
The Myth of Matter. Fundamenta Scientiae. 1987;(7):323-32.
" Abstract Ideas " and Immaterialism in George Berkeley 1685-1985. History of European ideas. 1986;(7):617-22.
Essays on Berkeley : a tercentennial celebration. Oxford New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press; 1985.
The General Form of the Argument for Berkelian Idealism. In: Foster J, editor. Essays on Berkeley: a Tercentennial Celebration. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1985. p. 163-86.
"The mind‑body problem". In: Harre R, Lamb R, editors. The Encyclopedic dictionary of psychology. Oxford: Blackwell Reference; 1983. p. 395-7.
Aristotelian dualism. In: J. A, editor. Oxford studies in ancient philosophy. Vol 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1983. p. 123-44.
Matter and sense : a critique of contemporary materialism. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge University Press; 1982.
Is Hare a Naturalist? The Philosophical Review. 1982;91(1):73-86.
Imagination, Desire and Prescription. Analysis. 1981;41(1):55-9.
Mackie's Interpretation of Hume. Analysis. 1980;40(1):19-24.
Aristophanes, Coleridge and Peacock. Notes and Queries. 1979;26(3):232.
Mind and Body in Aristotle. The Classical Quarterly. 1978;28(1):105-24.
The Mind-Body Problem in Contemporary Philosophy. Zygon. Journal of Religion and Science. 1976;11(4):346-60.
Prime Matter in Aristotle. Phronesis. 1974;19(2):168-88.
The Irrelevance of Intentionality to Perception. The Philosophical Quarterly. 1974;24(97):300-15.
Professor Armstrong On `Non-Physical Sensory Items'. Mind. 1972;81(321):84-6.